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IFIGENEIA GIANNADAKI
THE TIME LIMIT (PROTHESMIA) IN THE GRAPHE 
PARANOMON1
Abstract
The graphe paranomon was a public case (dike demosia) introduced against 
illegal legislation in classical Athens. Although the procedure has attracted the 
attention of modern scholarship with regard to its function and significance  
in the Athenian legal system, the statutory limitation on the liability of the 
author of a decree (prothesmia) has been only marginally addressed by modern 
scholars. This paper discusses the question of the time limit on the liability of 
the author from the time of the formal introduction of his decree, and, after 
thorough examination and evaluation of the sources, it establishes the length of 
the time limit as one year. It also offers an explanation of the rationale behind 
the tight statutory limitation, compared with other known statutory time limits 
in Athenian law, and the implications for the purpose and function of the graphe 
paranomon in the Athenian legal system in general. 
La graphe paranomon era un’azione pubblica (dike demosia) destinata a 
colpire le proposte illegali di legge ad Atene. Benché tale procedura abbia 
ampiamente attirato l’attenzione della dottrina riguardo alla sua funzione e al 
suo significato nell’ordinamento giuridico ateniese, la decadenza (prothesmia) 
dall’azione di responsabilità nei confronti dell’autore di un decreto è stata presa 
in considerazione solo marginalmente.  Il presente articolo discute la questione 
del limite temporale entro il quale poteva essere fatta valere la responsabilità 
dell’autore di un decreto a partire dal momento della formale proposta di esso. 
Dopo un accurato esame delle fonti, si giunge al affermare che il limite era di un 
anno, e si propone anche una spiegazione del criterio che determinava un termine 
così breve, se comparato con altri termini di prescrizione nel diritto ateniese. Se 
ne illustrano infine le implicazioni riguardo allo scopo e alla funzione della graphe 
paranomon nel quadro dell’ordinamento giuridico ateniese nel suo complesso. 
1  This paper was presented at the American Philological Association Meeting in Phi-
ladelphia in 2012 and in at the Ionian University, Corfu (Greece) subsequently. I would like 
to thank both audiences for their valuable comments. I would also like to thank warmly 
Professor Chris Carey and Professor Peter J. Rhodes for their invaluable comments and sug-
gestions on earlier drafts of the article, from which I have enormously benefited, as well as 
the anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions. 
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Introduction
In the Athenian legal system there was a public case which could be 
introduced against the author of a proposal (before the Boule or the Ekklesia) 
on the ground that it was illegal in substance or in procedure.2 Ho boulomenos, 
a volunteer prosecutor,3 could lodge a charge against the proposer of a decree 
either after it had been passed by the Boule and before it was ratified by the 
Ekklesia4 or after it was formally introduced to, or passed by, the Ekklesia.5  
The procedure was initiated by making a sworn statement, hypomosia,6 
during the debate on the proposal in question (in the Boule or the Ekklesia) 
and then lodging the written charge with the thesmothetai.7 There were no 
prescribed penalties for the convicted author of an illegal decree and the 
penalty was determined through the procedure of timesis―the delivery of a 
second set of speeches by both litigants proposing a penalty for the offender 
(agon timetos). In case of conviction, the proposal (probouleuma or decree) was 
repealed and the author was punished, usually with a fine.8 In addition, if 
a man was convicted three times in a graphe paranomon he suffered atimia, 
disfranchisement.9 
The aspect of the graphe paranomon on which this paper focuses relates to 
the question of the existence of a statutory limit on the period of liability for 
the author of a decree and the implications of a time limit for the function 
of the procedure. We are told in the second Hypothesis to the speech Against 
Leptines (Hypothesis 2.3 to Dem. 20): 
2  The law is not preserved, but given the hostility of the Athenians towards the idea of in-
dicting people when there was no alleged breach of a written law (cf. Andoc. 1.87) and the level 
of detail about the procedure found in the extant sources, one can be certain that a law/clauses 
in different laws must have authorised the use of the graphe paranomon; the wording of the law 
would run something like: ἐάν τις παράνομα γράφῃ/ γράψῃ, γραφέσθω παρανόμων πρὸς τοὺς 
θεσμοθέτας ὁ βουλόμενος τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἷς ἔξεστιν/ τὰς γραφὰς πρὸς τοὺς θεσμοθέτας τῶν 
παρανόμων εἶναι κατ’ αὐτοῦ. For the formulation of preserved punitive clauses in Athenian 
laws, cf. Télfy 1868: nos. 1025, 1053, 1072, 1092, 1098, 1113; see Giannadaki 2014: 22-23.  
3  [Dem.] 59.90ff., cf. Aesch. 3.13-14.
4  Hansen 1974: 28-9; cat. nos. 13 (not entirely clear from the text), 30; 1987: 63-73; 
Carawan 2007: 20 with n.3.
5  Hansen 1974: cat. no. 3 (formally introduced but not passed by the Ekklesia); passed 
by the Ekklesia: cat. nos. 4, 5, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 27, 38.
6  Cf. Dem. 18.103.
7  Dem. 26.8; Hyp. Ag. Athenog. 6; Ath. Pol. 59.2; for the technical aspects of lodging the 
written charge in graphai paranomon see Harris 2013: 121-122.
8  The attested fines range from 25 drachmai to several talents (10 talents attested 
in [Dem.] 58.1, 31-32). Cf. Hansen 1974: 53 (potentially death penalty). If the law said that 
the jury should assess ὅ τι ἂν δοκῇ ἄξιος εἶναι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, as an agon atimetos (for 
the formulation of the clause see Canevaro 2013: 228; cf. e.g. Dem. 24.63), then death must 
always have been a hypothetical possibility, though evidently very remote. 
9  [Dem.] 51.12; Hyp. Ag. Philippides 11, Antiph. 194.13-14 (Kassel-Austin); Diod. 18.18.2; 
Hansen 1974: 25; MacDowell 2009: 155 n.7.
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νόμος γὰρ ἦν τὸν γράψαντα νόμον ἢ ψήφισμα μετὰ ἐνιαυτὸν μὴ εἶναι 
ὑπεύθυνον. 
there was a law prescribing that the author of laws and decrees is no longer 
liable after the lapse of one year.10 
Although the validity of this limit in case of laws is corroborated by other 
sources, its existence in the case of decrees has been questioned in recent 
scholarship. The reliability of this hypothesis has been recently doubted by 
Carawan,11 who suggests that restricted liability in the cases of decrees ‘may 
be simply a mistake’. 
Establishing the time limit and the question of commencement of liability 
for the author
The main argument for scepticism with reference to a time limit is that 
the author of the Hypothesis (quoted above) generalises from the case at hand 
and applies to the graphe paranomon the statute of limitation for the liability of 
the author which applied only to the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai.12 The 
authorship of this Hypothesis cannot be determined with certainty, but it has 
been attributed to Menander of Laodikeia,13 the third-century AD rhetorician. 
Although some scholars recognise silently or in passing14 the existence of a 
time limit in the graphe paranomon, Carawan (2007) doubted its existence, while 
MacDowell took a ‘middle’, agnostic position by suggesting that it is not known 
whether this prescription did exist with regard to decrees.15 
The most important source of evidence in support of the statement of 
the Hypothesis is a passage from the speech Against Aristocrates, Dem. 23.104. 
Euthycles, the man who indicted Aristocrates’ decree which proposed grants 
of honours to Charidemos, in his attempt to challenge the legality of the 
decree, cites an example of a decree which took effect, while the proposer was 
immune from prosecution, after the lapse of a certain period of time. 
ὅτε Μιλτοκύθης ἀπέστη Κότυος, συχνὸν ἤδη χρόνον ὄντος τοῦ πολέμου, καὶ 
ἀπηλλαγμένου μὲν Ἐργοφίλου, μέλλοντος δ’ Αὐτοκλέους ἐκπλεῖν στρατηγοῦ, 
ἐγράφη τι παρ’ ὑμῖν ψήφισμα τοιοῦτον, δι’ οὗ Μιλτοκύθης μὲν ἀπῆλθε φοβηθεὶς 
καὶ νομίσας ὑμᾶς οὐ προσέχειν αὐτῷ, Κότυς δ’ ἐγκρατὴς τοῦ τ’ ὄρους τοῦ 
ἱεροῦ καὶ τῶν θησαυρῶν ἐγένετο. καὶ γάρ τοι μετὰ ταῦτ’, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, 
10  The translations of the Greek are mine, unless stated otherwise. 
11  Carawan 2007: 33.
12  Kahrstedt 1937-1938: 25; Lipsius 1905-1915: 386; Carawan 2007: 33, but he offers 
no evidence to disprove the reliability of the Hypothesis.
13  Heath 2004: 161-163. Cf. Kremmydas 2012: 62.
14  Such as Bonner/ Smith 1938: 290, Hansen 1991: 207, Kapparis 1999: 179, Heskel 
1997: 84 with n.75, Sundahl 2000: 15, Todd 2007: 526, Carey 1992: 87, Kremmydas 2012: 422,
15  MacDowell 1971: 50-51 no comment; 2009: 155.
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Αὐτοκλῆς μὲν ἐκρίνετο ὡς ἀπολωλεκὼς Μιλτοκύθην, οἱ δὲ χρόνοι κατὰ τοῦ 
τὸ ψήφισμ’ εἰπόντος τῆς γραφῆς ἐξεληλύθεσαν, τὰ δὲ πράγματ’ ἀπωλώλει τῇ 
πόλει. (Dem. 23.104)
After the revolt of Miltocythes against Cotys, when the war had lasted a 
considerable time, when Ergophilos had been superseded, and Autocles was 
about to sail away to take command, a decree was proposed here in such 
terms that Miltocythes withdrew in alarm, supposing that you were not well 
disposed towards him, and Cotys gained possession of the Sacred Mountain 
and its treasures. And after this, men of Athens, although Autocles was put 
on his trial for having brought Miltocythes to ruin, the time for indicting the 
author of the decree had lapsed; and, so far as the city was concerned, the 
whole business had come to grief. (Trans. Vince 1935 adapted).
The incident is dated to 361 BCE:16 Miltocythes revolted against Cotys 
in Thrace and he asked the Athenians for support. The Athenians passed 
the decree in question, whose content is not known, but it resulted in the 
withdrawal of Miltocythes and victory of Cotys over the Sacred Mountain. It is 
reasonable to assume that the decree contained instructions for the Athenian 
generals in Thrace, including Autocles. The general Autocles was condemned 
afterwards (apparently through an eisangelia)17 as he was thought to be 
responsible for this adverse result of the war in Thrace for Athens. However, 
the author of the decree was no longer liable to punishment. We do not learn the 
name of the proposer and although unprovable, it cannot be entirely ruled out 
that it was Autocles himself, but the implication from the text is that they are 
two separate individuals. In any case, this does not affect my argument.18 
One possible interpretation of the Greek passage is that the chronological 
point (οἱ δὲ χρόνοι…) might indicate that a graphe paranomon should be lodged 
in a specific period of the year; this time reference could then suggest a period of 
suspension. We do have evidence for limited periods of prosecution during a 
year in some types of cases: trading cases, for instance, could be brought every 
month (from Boedromion to Mounichion) except in  the summer months, in 
order to enable the sailors and traders to make the most of the good sailing 
weather.19 The plural number might well lend itself to such a reading. However, 
16  Heskel 1997: 77 (March-April 361), 84.
17  Hansen 1975: 95-96 (cat. no. 90), 1987a: 172 n.590.
18  Carawan 2007: 34 n.35 assumes that Autocles was the proposer, but this is unpro-
vable. The text rather implies that he is a distinct person from the author of the decree.
19  This is the most likely reading of Dem. 33.23 αἱ δὲ λήξεις τοῖς ἐμπόροις τῶν δικῶν 
ἔμμηνοί εἰσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ βοηδρομιῶνος μέχρι τοῦ μουνιχιῶνος; but the specific period du-
ring which litigation was not allowed is debated (summer or winter); however, it is ge-
nerally agreed that there was a specific period in the year when such cases could not be 
initiated and this is what matters for my argument. See recently MacDowell 2009: 260; 
Todd 1993: 334-335. Cf. also Antiphon 6.38, 42: the basileus was not permitted to accept an 
indictment for homicide cases during the last three months of his office (because the three 
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we have no evidence for any such restriction in the graphe paranomon, which 
makes this hypothesis unlikely. Also, the verb used here (οἱ δὲ χρόνοι… 
ἐξεληλύθεσαν)20 as well as the pluperfect tense suggest not a temporary 
suspension, but an absolute expiry (cf. LSJ s.v. II.).21 Therefore, this passage is 
best explained by assuming that there was a statutory limitation relating to 
the liability of the author in the graphe paranomon, and in this case the author 
of the decree was evidently no longer liable (hypeuthynos).22 Carawan23 in his 
attempt to show that there was no time limit to a mover’s liability, dismisses 
this passage. He notes its existence in a footnote but does not discuss it in 
any detail and thus he does not address its implications for prothesmia  for the 
liability of the author in the graphe paranomon. He further bases his objection 
on the assumption that the graphe paranomon seems to have targeted mainly 
honorific decrees and a time limit to the liability of the author would not 
be meaningful, as honorific decrees had limited effect anyway. However, 
the graphe paranomon was not restricted to honorary decrees with limited 
effect; there is a range of preserved decrees granting citizenship, protection 
to certain benefactors of Athens, enktesis (right to own land in Attica), ateleia 
(exemption from tax) and isoteleia (exemption from certain tax responsibilities 
for non Athenians), which were meant to last for a lifetime, and were even 
occasionally extended to the descendants of the honorand too, rather than 
being time-limited privileges.24  
A further argument in favour of the common-sense interpretation of Dem. 
23.104 as evidence for the time limit in the graphe paranomon is offered by the 
complementary procedure of the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai. This legal 
action was instituted after the revision of the laws at the end of the 5th century 
BCE (403/402)25 as a measure against the introduction of inexpedient laws. The 
graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai has been seen as a result of the distinction 
between decrees and laws,26 which is dated to this period, and it is widely 
preliminary hearings, in three successive months, and the introduction of the case in the 
fourth month would have to be completed during his term of office). Also, Ath. Pol. 52.2.
20  Cf. Dem. 20.144 ὃς αὐτὸν ἔτ’ ὄνθ’ ὑπεύθυνον  ἐγράψατο, ἐξῆλθον οἱ χρόνοι, καὶ 
νυνὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου πᾶς ἐσθ’ ὁ λόγος…; also Dem. 36.26-27 (λαβὲ δή μοι καὶ τὸν τῆς 
προθεσμίας νόμον. (…) Ἀπολλόδωρος δ’ οὑτοσὶ παρεληλυθότων ἐτῶν πλέον ἢ εἴκοσιν…; 
Hyp. Eux. 35 του εξελθόντος μηνός;  Hdt. 2.139; Xen. Hell. 5.2.2; cf. Dem. 23.80 παρεληλύθασιν 
οἱ χρόνοι ἐν οἷς ἔδει τούτων ἕκαστα ποιεῖν. 
21  For other ‘expiration terminology’ cf. Dem. 39.17 κατὰ τοὐνόματος τοῦ ἐμαυτοῦ 
πατρόθεν δέχεσθαι τὴν λῆξιν (‘expiry’); contrast Dem. 45.4 for the language of temporary 
suspension: οὐ γὰρ ἦσαν ἐν τῷ τότε καιρῷ δίκαι, ἀλλ’ ἀνεβάλλεσθ’ ὑμεῖς διὰ τὸν πόλεμον.
22  Thus Hansen 1987a: 172 n.591.
23  2007: 34 n.35.
24  Carawan 2007: 36. On the hereditary character of ateleia cf. IG II² 53.2-3. On the 
prothesmia in the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai see Dem. 20.144 with Hansen 1985: 370; 
Kremmydas 2012: 422; MacDowell 2009: 155.
25  Kahrstedt 1937-1938: 24; Wolff 1970: 41; Hansen 1991: 175.
26  See Kremmydas 2012: 45-46; Hansen 1978: 317.
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accepted27 that the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai postdates the graphe 
paranomon. Apparently the latter procedure was used without discrimination 
for both laws and decrees before 403 BCE,28 while the graphe paranomon is first 
datably attested in 415 BCE (Andoc. 1.17),29 and it has been suggested with 
plausibility by Rhodes30 that at that time it was a recent institution; the graphe 
nomon me epitedeion theinai is attested only in the 4th century.31
Both legal actions have similarities in the procedures as well as in nature 
(both are graphai, public cases, and both are agones timetoi). The plaintiff’s 
intention to proceed in a graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai was declared as 
soon as he made a special sworn statement, the hypomosia, as is the case in the 
graphe paranomon;32 in both procedures the hypomosia had the immediate effect 
of blocking the new piece of legislation33 and put it to further scrutiny by the 
court, and the thesmothetai accepted both cases.34 In addition, the graphe nomon 
me epitedeion theinai gave a significant flexibility to the volunteer prosecutor 
in lodging his charge, as graphe paranomon did: a new law could be indicted 
either before or after its enactment by the nomothetai,35 and similarly a decree 
could be indicted after its passage by the Boule and before (probouleuma) or 
after its passage by the Ekklesia. Finally, in both legal actions the court not 
only penalised the author after conviction, but repealed his measure too as 
inexpedient or illegal respectively. It is reasonable to suppose that the graphe 
paranomon, which predated graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai, served as the 
model for legislation concerning the examination of the propriety of new laws 
and especially in regard to the penalties and the liability of the authors. 
27  Rhodes 1981: 545; see Hansen 1978: 325-329. Thus Sundahl 2000: 26-27, Kremmydas 
2012: 46.
28  Before 403 BCE, there was no formal distinction between laws and decrees; cf. 
Hansen 1991: 175.
29  It was abolished in 411 and 404 BCE (Rhodes 1981: 660).
30  1981: 378. Jones (1957: 123) suggested that the graphe paranomon was instituted 
at the time of the reforms of Ephialtes in 462 BCE, when the Areiopagos had been reduced 
to a homicide court; however, there is a notable silence in the sources before the first cer-
tainly datable case (415 BCE; Hansen 1974: cat. no. 1), which makes this hypothesis rather 
implausible in a society in which prosecution and litigiousness through this procedure 
became notorious. This example is dated to the time when the last example of ostracism 
(to prevent future tyrannies) occurs (Forsdyke 2005: 164), i.e. 417-415 BCE (Thuc. 8.73.3, 
Hyperbolos). Thus, Forsdyke 2005: 174 n.139; Hansen 1991: 205. Cf. Lanni-Vermeule 2012-
2013: 10, Lanni 2010: 2, Sundahl 2000: 24-26.
31  The first known case is dated to 382/381: see Sundahl 2000: 24 (Dem. 24.138).
32  For decrees, see Dem. 18.103; for laws, see Kremmydas 2012: 47. 
33  This is indicated in Dem. 23.93 οἱ δὲ γραψάμενοι καὶ χρόνους ἐμποιήσαντες καὶ δι’ 
οὓς ἄκυρόν ἐστιν, ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν…; Poll. 8.56 καὶ οὐκ ἦν μετὰ τὴν ὑπομωσίαν τὸ γραφέν, πρὶν 
κριθῆναι. Sundahl 2000: 10; MacDowell 1971: 50 (no evidence). Cf. Dem. 26.8.
34  Ath. Pol. 59.2.
35  Kremmydas 2012: 46.
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The existence of a prothesmia is firmly established for the graphe nomon me 
epitedeion theinai, as we can see from the case of Leptines, who was prosecuted 
through this legal action. Leptines’ trial is dated to 355/354 BCE (D.H. Amm. 1.4), 
while the charge was lodged a year earlier. As the plaintiff himself explicitly 
admits,36 Leptines is no longer liable to punishment for passing his allegedly 
inexpedient law. This evidence perfectly correlates with the information 
of the Hypothesis, which gives a limit of one year in the case of laws. If we 
consider the distinction between laws and psephismata and the superiority of 
the former to the latter in Athenian collective thinking, which is also reflected 
in legislation,37 it is intrinsically unlikely that the liability of the author in the 
case of decrees would be longer than in the case of laws: one needs to bear in 
mind that psephismata are rules with usually a narrower period of validity or 
target, while laws are generally permanent rules.38 Thus, it is reasonable to 
assume that the time limitation would be the same for both procedures, or, if 
one time limitation were to be longer than the other, we would expect the time 
limitation in graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai cases to be longer than that for 
graphe paranomon cases. As a result, the time limit for the graphe paranomon 
is unlikely to have been more than a year. Though any reconstruction of the 
dynamics of the legislation must be conjectural, given that the graphe nomon 
me epitedeion theinai was modelled according to the existing graphe paranomon, 
it is highly likely that the one-year limitation existed already in relation to 
graphe paranomon and was then introduced in the graphe nomon me epitedeion 
theinai39 and that the author of the Hypothesis is not generalising from the case 
at hand, as has been supposed, but is describing a real practice. 
But a crucial question, which has not been explored by modern scholarship, 
is when does the clock start ticking? The implication of Dem. 23.104 is that the 
prothesmia relates to the enactment of a proposal, and in this case apparently 
by the Ekklesia, as the prescribed action has been implemented.40 In addition, 
Dem. 23.9241 shows that a probouleuma would be invalid after a year of its formal 
36  Dem. 20.144 ἄλλως τε καὶ γεγενημένου σοι τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀκινδύνου. διὰ γὰρ τὸ 
τελευτῆσαι Βάθιππον τὸν τουτουὶ πατέρ’ Ἀψεφίωνος, ὃς αὐτὸν ἔτ’ ὄνθ’ ὑπεύθυνον 
ἐγράψατο, ἐξῆλθον οἱ χρόνοι, καὶ νυνὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νόμου πᾶς ἐσθ’ ὁ λόγος, τούτῳ δ’ 
οὐδείς ἐστι κίνδυνος.
37  Andoc. 1.87 (no decree can override a law), Dem. 23.87 with Canevaro 2013: 75-76; 
e.g. Hansen 1991: 170-4; Sealey 1987: 32-52; Todd 1993: 18-9.
38  Hansen 1978: 317 and 1991: 156-157 for the various types of decrees.
39  We should note also that this was not a common prothesmia (see section II below), 
but in fact very tight compared to other time limitations, which makes the association of 
the one-year limitation with the graphe paranomon very likely. 
40  In regard to the Boule, the implication of the extant cases of indictments of probou-
leumata is that the author became liable from the time of the passage of his proposal by the 
Boule: Callixenos’ decree for the trial of the Arginousai generals (Hansen 1974: cat. no. 3); 
Ctesiphon’s decree Dem. 18.9, 53 (Hansen 1974: cat. no. 30). 
41  προβούλευμα γάρ ἐστιν, ὁ νόμος δ’ ἐπέτεια κελεύει τὰ τῆς βουλῆς εἶναι 
ψηφίσματα…
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introduction/passage by the Boule, if the Ekklesia had not yet ratified it;42 but 
its expiration did not affect the proposer’s liability (Dem. 23.93 τὸ ψήφισμα 
τοῦθ’ οὗτος ἔγραψεν…): the proposer was liable for his measure if he formally 
introduced a decree. Thus the first passage shows that liability commenced 
from the time of the enactment of the decree in the Ekklesia and the latter case 
suggests that the proposer’s liability could also commence even earlier from 
the time of the approval of the proposal by the Boule (probouleuma).43 It is clear 
that liability to prosecution does not relate to a mere speech (legein) in the 
Boule or the Ekklesia, but to a formally introduced (graphein) or voted motion.44 
Furthermore, there is no evidence to support indictment of a proposal before 
its approval by the Boule, although it would be entirely possible. The absence in 
the sources of proposals being challenged before they pass at the Boule is easily 
explained: it would be unnecessary and unwise for a rhetor to indict a proposal 
at that early stage, since the proposal might not be passed by the Boule anyway 
and he would unnecessarily undertake the significant risks attached to the 
graphe paranomon (in case of conviction or failure to obtain  one-fifth of the 
votes of the court). 
42  Rhodes (1972: 63) interprets the passage (relying on the confusing Scholion on 
Dem. 23.92) as saying that a probouleuma was valid only for the year in which the Boule 
had passed it―bouleutic year), thus MacDowell 2009: 197. MacDowell considers (though as 
less possible) the interpretation ‘for one year after its passage’. The Scholion in question 
continues: ἑνιαύσια γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς τῆς βουλῆς τὰ ψηφίσματα. ἐπέτεια and the Scholiast’s 
ἐνιαύσια can have the meaning of ‘annual/ once a year’ as well as express duration of 
time, ‘for a year’ (cf. LSJ s.vv.). The Demosthenic passage seems not to support the first 
possibility, only the Scholion refers to the year in which a decree is introduced, but given 
the inherent confusion in the Scholion, this seems not to be a reliable source. The second 
interpretation (‘for a year’) seems more plausible as Dem. 23.92 refers to duration of time, 
but without linking the duration of the validity of a decree with the duration of office of 
the Boule which passed it. Furthermore, on the hypothesis that this reference was associat-
ed with the expiration of office of the Boule, each decree voted by the bouleutai would have 
different period of validity, and this would create significant discrepancies for the Boule 
in terms of the validity and enactment. Also, this would create further discrepancies for 
the liability of authors, given that there would not be a single time period common for all 
proposers; the time would vary, dramatically in some cases. Thus it seems more plausible 
that the reference is the one-year period from the time of the passage of the decree, which 
would make its validity, enactment and liability consistent. The late and confusing Scholia 
may well misread the Demosthenic passage (cf. Carey 1995: esp. 114, 117 for misreading of 
texts by later lexicographers/ authors, in another context). That the Scholiast misread the 
text is entirely possible in our case too.
43  In cases of probouleumata, the approval of the proposal by the Ekklesia was signi-
fied by the enactment of the decree. 
44  Cf. Dem. 1.19 ‘τί οὖν;’ ἄν τις εἴποι, ‘σὺ γράφεις ταῦτ’ εἶναι στρατιωτικά;’ μὰ Δί’ οὐκ 
ἔγωγε, as against [Dem.] 59.4-5 ἔγραψε ψήφισμα ἐν τῇ βουλῇ Ἀπολλόδωρος βουλεύων 
καὶ ἐξήνεγκε προβούλευμα εἰς τὸν δῆμον, λέγον διαχειροτονῆσαι τὸν δῆμον εἴτε δοκεῖ τὰ 
περιόντα χρήματα τῆς διοικήσεως στρατιωτικὰ εἶναι εἴτε θεωρικά. (...) γραψάμενος γὰρ 
παρανόμων τὸ ψήφισμα Στέφανος οὑτοσί… Dem. 1.19 suggests that a mere proposal which 
was not formally introduced in writing would not make the speaker liable, in stark con-
trast with the formal introduction of a decree in writing (graphein), which made the pro-
poser liable for his suggested policy, as in Apollodoros’ case. Cf. Dem. 18.28 (graphein), 219 
graphon, ‘he who writes’ a motion for a decree (Hansen 1991: 143-144).
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There are, however, some cases which prima facie do not fit the model of 
the one-year prothesmia which has been described so far. The author of one 
of the decrees honouring Demosthenes, Ctesiphon, is liable six years after 
the passage of his probouleuma, and despite the fact that the probouleuma 
would have technically expired after a year if it was not enacted (cf. Dem. 
23.92). Carawan45 along with other scholars46 has supposed that the liability 
of Ctesiphon is ‘peculiar’. He suggests that ‘it may have been subject to an 
exception or a change in law’. However, we have no evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. A closer examination of the speeches shows that the liability of 
Ctesiphon does not disprove the information we receive about time limit from 
Dem. 23.104 (psephismata) and from Dem. 23.91-92 (probouleumata). 
Both Demosthenes and Aeschines constantly and consistently argue as 
if the lapse of time made no difference to the liability of Ctesiphon, while 
Ctesiphon’s probouleuma for crowning Demosthenes was passed by the Boule in 
336 BCE, and the trial took place six years later (in 330 BCE).47 
Dem. 18.15-6 [15.] νῦν δ’ ἐκστὰς τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ δικαίας ὁδοῦ καὶ φυγὼν 
τοὺς παρ’ αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματ’ ἐλέγχους, τοσούτοις ὕστερον χρόνοις αἰτίας καὶ 
σκώμματα καὶ λοιδορίας συμφορήσας ὑποκρίνεται· εἶτα κατηγορεῖ μὲν ἐμοῦ, 
κρίνει δὲ τουτονί, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀγῶνος ὅλου τὴν πρὸς ἔμ’ ἔχθραν προΐσταται, 
οὐδαμοῦ δ’ ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀπηντηκὼς [16.] ἐμοὶ τὴν ἑτέρου ζητῶν ἐπιτιμίαν 
ἀφελέσθαι φαίνεται. 
Now, long afterwards, he has gathered a heap of derisive and abusive 
charges and puts on a show. What’s more, he accuses me but puts Ctesiphon 
on trial. He makes his feud with me the foremost issue of the entire lawsuit, 
but, although he has never challenged me directly, he seems bent on depriving 
another man of his rights. (Trans. Yunis 2005)
Aesch. 3.210 ὅλως δὲ τί τὰ δάκρυα; τίς ἡ κραυγή; τίς ὁ τόνος τῆς φωνῆς; οὐχ 
ὁ μὲν τὴν γραφὴν φεύγων ἐστὶ Κτησιφῶν, ὁ δ’ ἀγὼν οὐκ ἀτίμητος; σὺ δ’ οὔτε 
περὶ τῆς οὐσίας οὔτε περὶ τοῦ σώματος οὔτε περὶ τῆς ἐπιτιμίας ἀγωνίζῃ· ἀλλὰ 
περὶ τίνος ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ἡ σπουδή; περὶ χρυσῶν στεφάνων καὶ κηρυγμάτων ἐν τῷ 
θεάτρῳ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους·  
But anyway, why the tears? Why the noise? Why the shrill voice? Isn’t 
Ctesiphon the man under indictment? Isn’t this trial one with the penalty 
assessed? As to you, you are not on trial for your property, your life, or your 
citizen status. But what is it that so concerns him? Gold crowns and illegal 
proclamations in the theatre. (Trans. Carey 2000)
More importantly, relying on Aesch. 3 and Dem. 18, we can confidently date 
the time of the indictment within three or four months from the time of the passage 
45  Carawan 2007: 35 with n.36.
46  Hansen 1987: 66-67; cf. Yunis 2001: 11 with n.47.
47  For likely reasons for delay, see Harris 1995: 138-142; Horváth 2016. 
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of Ctesiphon’s motion: the decree was passed in or after Scirophorion 337 BCE (the 
earliest possible date),48 while the indictment came before the assassination of 
Philip in 336 BCE (Aesch. 3.219), which is safely dated to the Macedonian month 
Dios (October),49 that is corresponding to the Athenian months Boedromion and 
Pyanepsion (September/ October - October/ November) of the year 336 BCE. 
This must be the case with the indictment brought by Diondas against 
Hyperides and Demomeles who proposed a grant of honours for Demosthenes. 
The defence speech against Diondas survives in fragments. Hyperides’ and 
Demomeles’ proposal was made in 338 BCE (before the battle of Chaeronea), 
but the trial took place four years after the proposal, i.e. 335/334 BCE.50 As 
appears from the extant fragments of the speech, Hyperides is still liable to 
punishment,51 but as we know from Dem. 18.222 Hyperides and Demomeles 
were acquitted. We can infer by analogy from Ctesiphon’s case that Hyperides’ 
proposal (either probouleuma or psephisma)52 was indicted within a year of its 
passage, which explains his liability even after the interval of four years until 
the day of the trial.53 Therefore, it is clear that the prothesmia for the liability of 
the author of a decree commenced from the time of the passage of the proposal 
by the Boule or from the time of the formal introduction of a proposal (graphein)54 or 
its passage by the Ekklesia, and if the indictment was brought within the one-
year period, the author of a decree was still liable, even if the trial took place 
more than a year after the proposal or the passage of the measure. The reason 
for this rule is fairly obvious. If the liability related to the date of the trial of 
a graphe paranomon, it is reasonable to assume that either side or even both 
would have tried to postpone the proceedings for the trial until the liability of 
the author lapsed.55 
48  Demosthenes was still hypeuthynos for two offices when Ctesiphon’s decree 
passed: Aesch. 3.24, Dem. 18.111, 113.
49  Diod. 16.91ff. with Efstathiou 2009: 698-699.
50  Carey et al. 2008: 2-3; Horváth 2008 (spring 335/334 BCE), 2014: 10 (between Janu-
ary and March 335/334 BCE); Rhodes 2009: 226 (May-June 335/334 BCE). Hansen (1974: 36) 
mistakenly dates the trial to 338 BCE.
51  Ag. Diondas 145r. 1-4 (pag.3); 173r 25-33 (pag.5); 174r 22-24 (pag.8). Rhodes 2009: 
224 notes that the indictment came within a year, underlining the fact that Hyperides was 
still liable. However, in terms of limitation he seems to think that the time limit is not a 
calendar year running from the time of the proposal, but he associates it with the bouleutic 
year (cf. n.42 above).
52  It is not known whether the decree had been passed by the Boule or the Ekklesia. 
Rhodes 2009: 224; Carey et al. 2008: 16; cf. Horváth 2008: 27 and 2014: 1-2, 141, who takes 
προεβούλευσα (144v. 25) with the technical sense of ‘pass a decree by the Boule’, but the 
syntax makes it less likely. 
53  The most probable reason for the delay is that Diondas postponed the trial on the 
grounds of his absence abroad for military service (see [Dem.] 48.24 καλλίστη ἀναβολή). 
Cf. Horváth 2014: 35-45; 2016 for the grounds of postponement of a graphe paranomon trial.
54  For the distinction between legein and graphein, see n.44 above.
55  There are cases where the litigants postponed the trial (Dem. 18, Aesch. 3; Hyp. Ag. 
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Having established the one-year prothesmia in graphai paranomon, a further 
question still remains, namely, whether there was a single law regulating the 
prothesmia, or more than one. We do have references to time limits in the sources 
and the references are always associated with a certain type of action, in the 
singular number.56 This may indicate that the speakers are referring to a specific 
prothesmia law attached to the offence they discuss, and prothesmia clauses 
then would appear in a number of different laws.57 Nevertheless, it is entirely 
conceivable that there was a single prothesmia law, or a prothesmia clause in a 
general law dealing with the graphe paranomon. The reference to ‘a prothesmia 
law’ (Dem. 36.26-7) may well be a shorthand referring to a provision of a certain 
law relating to the case at hand, as generally happens in the orators: they call 
the secretary to read out certain clause(s) in support of their cases. It is more 
likely that there were specific time-limit clauses attached to certain laws, as the 
implication from other references to time limits suggest.58 Although there may 
have been some consolidation in the revised law code59 completed in 399 BCE, it 
is likely that a clause in the law instituting the graphe paranomon would outline 
the one-year time limit for the liability of the author; this is probably the case 
with the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai too, since it is only in connection with 
those types of graphai that the time limit had any meaning.  
Finally, there remains a question of terminology: one needs to ask what the 
likely wording of the time-limit clause in a law authorising (or associated with)  
the graphe paranomon would be. The term ὑπεύθυνος is found in Dem. 20.144 in 
relation to the time limit in the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai60 and it is entirely 
possible that the relevant clause for the graphe paranomon would have  employed 
similar terminology to indicate liability. Based on typical legal formulations of 
Athenian laws, one can possibly reconstruct the clauses referring to the graphe 
paranomon along the following lines: γραφέσθω ὁ βουλόμενος παρανόμων ἐντός 
Diondas); cf. also tactics for prolonging the deliberations in the Ekklesia, as it happened with 
the deliberations for the peace of Philocrates, where voting took place when it already be-
gan to darken: Aesch. 3.125-126, Dem. 19.144; Dem. 57.8-10. In modern terms, such delaying 
strategies include filibustering (USA Senate), which aims at postponing the voting about a 
proposal indefinitely in order to delay, or block the passage of a bill (cf. https://www.senate.
gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm). 
56  Cf. Dem. 38.17 (dike epitropes); 38.27, 36.26-27 (inheritance cases), Dem. 33.27-28 
(liability of guarantors), Dem. 43.16 (epikleros). In these sources, prothesmia is related to the 
time of the introduction (initiation or reopening) of a legal dispute in court, i.e. commen-
cement of the legal proceedings (cf.  Wolff 1963: 87-109). See also Griffith-Williams 2013: 
11.   
57  Cf. Todd 2007: 526.
58  Dem. 38.17, 27; Dem. 33.27-28; 43.16. Isai. 3.58.
59  Cf. the consolidation of the eisageltikos nomos, Rhodes 1981: 524-525.
60  ἄλλως τε καὶ γεγενημένου σοι τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀκινδύνου. διὰ γὰρ τὸ τελευτῆσαι 
Βάθιππον τὸν τουτουὶ πατέρ’ Ἀψεφίωνος, ὃς αὐτὸν ἔτ’ ὄνθ’ ὑπεύθυνον ἐγράψατο, ἐξῆλθον 
οἱ χρόνοι…
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ἑνιαυτοῦ/ τὸν γράψαντα νόμον ἢ ψήφισμα μετὰ ἑνιαυτόν μὴ εἶναι ὑπεύθυνον.61 
This is only an indicative way to think about terminology, and various other 
possibilities would be equally suitable to express the time limit.62
The rationale behind the time limit and its significance in the graphe 
paranomon 
Information  about the prothesmia and its purpose in the Athenian legal 
system is difficult to extract from the extant sources, as is often the case 
with the rationale behind legislation, whose purpose or function are always 
embedded in the laws and are not entirely obvious to the modern scholar as 
they might have been to the Athenians. We hear of various prothesmiai more 
frequently with the time limit of five years in certain types of dikai, such as 
dikai epitropes and cases relating to inheritance (Dem. 36.26-27 contractual 
disputes; 38.27 dike epitropes),63 where the law prescribes the five-year limit 
for initiating a legal action.  However, we simultaneously hear of cases where 
a prothesmia did not apply at all, such as in impiety and homicide cases,64 
presumably because of the pollution arising from killing, which could spread 
to society,65 and debts to the state treasury, which would never be discharged 
if a prothesmia for removal of liability applied.66 On the contrary, the absence 
of a time limit and the hereditary character of state debts (with the associated 
penalties for failure to pay) illustrate that there was an effective legal frame 
enabling the city to collect state debts from the debtor, or his heirs and also 
penalise them severely until the discharge of the debts.  
The information about the existence of a prothesmia relating to graphai in 
61  The wording of the Hypothesis 2.3 to Dem. 20 νόμος γὰρ ἦν τὸν γράψαντα νόμον 
ἢ ψήφισμα μετὰ ἐνιαυτὸν μὴ εἶναι ὑπεύθυνον may well be close to the wording of the law 
(although the Hypothesis is possibly drawing its terminology on Dem. 20.144). Cf. the similar 
wording in Ath. Pol. 48.5 ἐντὸς γʹ ἡ[μερῶν ἀφ’] ἧς ἔδωκε τὰς εὐθύνας εὔθυναν ἄν τ’ ἰδίαν ἄν τε 
δ[η]μο[σί]α[ν] ἐμβαλέσθαι… The term the Athenians used for ‘time limit’ is προθεσμία, as it is 
clear from other preserved laws prescribing time limitations (see n.56 and section II below).
62  Cf. Dem. 21.47 οἱ δὲ θεσμοθέται εἰσαγόντων εἰς τὴν ἡλιαίαν τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν 
ἀφ’ ἧς ἂν γραφῇ… (Canevaro 2013: 227 considers the limit clause as a reliable addition to a 
forged law about hybris); Isai. 10.12 (inheritance cases). 
63  Dem. 38.17 βούλομαι καὶ τοῦτον ὑμῖν τὸν νόμον εἰπεῖν, ὅστις διαρρήδην λέγει, 
ἐὰν πέντ’ ἔτη παρέλθῃ καὶ μὴ δικάσωνται, μηκέτ’ εἶναι τοῖς ὀρφανοῖς δίκην περὶ τῶν ἐκ τῆς 
ἐπιτροπῆς ἐγκλημάτων. καὶ ὑμῖν ἀναγνώσεται τὸν νόμον. Charles 1938: 4-5, 20 overstates 
his assumption that the five-year prothesmia was the standard in dikai (arguing e silentio). 
64  Lys. 13.83 οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων ἀδικημάτων προθεσμίαν εἶναι. 
This seems to be the case with impiety too (Lys. 7.17); see Todd 2007: 526. Cf. Phillips 2008: 
185 n.1. From a comparative perspective, it is worth noting that prosecutions for homicide 
have no time limit in modern Federal criminal law in the USA.
65  Charles 1938: 15.
66  Dem. 22.33-34; 24.201; 25.38, 42 Aristogeiton is still considered atimos for debts 
after seven years have lapsed. The heir could inherit atimia for public debts owed by his 
father. 
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general is not quite clear, and the extant evidence about limitations relates 
to the graphe paranomon and graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai. We also hear of 
shorter prothesmiai, as in cases of guarantors67 for payments falling due within 
a year.68 A fair question is why the proposer was responsible for only one year 
from the time of the formal introduction or passage of his decree by the Boule 
or the Ekklesia in a system which could deal quite ruthlessly with its politicians. 
One can plausibly infer that the one-year limitation was considered as an 
adequate period for a citizen to identify an illegal decree and lodge a charge 
against the proposer69 both in order to remove the illegal piece of legislation 
and have its proposer punished. This is at least the rationale the speaker of 
Dem. 36.26-27 attributes to Solon: he considered that the time period (five 
years in cases of contractual differences, in particular) would allow enough 
time for the victim to seek redress and for the dishonest party to be exposed. 
One does not have to take this statement at face value, as the intent attributed 
to the lawgiver for the time limit is part of the strategy of the orator in this 
passage,70 but this rationale was apparently expected to be credible and to find 
favour with (some of) the audience.
Simultaneously, the graphe paranomon may well have functioned as a means 
of ensuring ‘accountability’ for a rhetor, in effect, granted that rhetores did not 
undergo euthynai, or any other kind of formal scrutiny for their proposals and 
policies in the Ekklesia in general.71 Thus by analogy with the accountability of 
the officials who had to render euthynai after the term of their (typically) annual 
office, a proposer could be very economically checked by another rhetor, who 
could act as a voluntary prosecutor through a graphe paranomon72 at any time, 
compared to euthynai, which only took place after the end of term of office 
67  Dem. 33.27-28 λαβὲ δή μοι καὶ τὸν νόμον, ὃς κελεύει τὰς ἐγγύας ἐπετείους εἶναι.
68  As MacDowell 2004: 106 n.32 rightly notes, the relevant law does not exonerate 
the speaker from liability and the meaning of the law must therefore have been that a gua-
rantor was liable only for payments falling due within one year, not that legal proceedings 
against him must be taken within one year. Cf. p.8 above about the expiry of probouleumata 
which have not been enacted within a year.
69  A similar rationale for longer time limits can be seen in the USA Federal law, beyond 
the standard five-year statutotry limitation: namely, the investigative difficulties or the se-
riousness of the crime. There is no time limit in homicide cases, a twenty-year time limit for 
theft of an artwork, ten years for arson, certain crimes against financial institutions, and 
immigration offences. See Doyle 2012.
70  Cf. Giannadaki 2016. 
71  Rhetores could undergo the dokimasia rhetoron; however, it did not concern their pro-
posals, but their suitability for the task itself of making proposals. And it was an ad hoc pro-
cedure brought like any other public action by ho boulomenos, not a routine process as in the 
case of magistrates. For the procedure of the dokimasia rhetoron see MacDowell 2005: 79-87.
72  Cf. Bauman 1990: 94-95 noting that ‘it [the graphe paranomon] saddled rhetors with a 
responsibility equivalent to that resting on the holders of public office, so that in a certain 
sense it can be described as the non-office-holder’s euthynai’. Sinclair 1988: 152: the graphe 
paranomon ‘was one way of applying to the rhetores the general principle of personal respon-
sibility for public acts’ (Din. 1.100-101). 
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of an official. This important aspect of the procedure cannot be overlooked 
and certainly was not overlooked by the Athenians themselves, who often 
employed the graphe paranomon as a powerful weapon to control their political 
rivals,73 and were competing to win the favour of the demos.74  
After a year, a decree which had not been enacted would become 
invalid (Dem. 23.90), and therefore the proposal would not be implemented; 
simultaneously the author, after a year from the introduction of his proposal, 
would be free from liability anyway. There is no surviving speech about a 
decree which is challenged after its implementation, i.e. after it has taken 
effect. Nonetheless, there is evidence to indicate that an indictment even 
against a decree which had taken effect may have been a possibility. More 
specifically, the case of Callixenos (Hansen 1974: cat. no. 3) shows that after 
the enactment of the decree the proposer was sued by another procedure at 
a later stage (Xen. Hell. 1.7.35). Dem. 23.104 also suggests that the author of a 
decree which had been implemented was immune, the implication being that 
since liability had lapsed, a graphe paranomon against the author would not be 
effective (given that the decree was already enacted).75 These examples do not 
suggest that a graphe paranomon was not a possibility, but rather that another 
procedure could be more effectively employed after the time limit of one year.76 
Carawan, however, doubts the possibility of quashing a decree after it 
has taken effect and he bases his objection on the irreversible character of 
certain types of decrees and especially punitive decrees, which could not 
be reversed after they had taken effect. His objection is absolutely justified 
in terms of the irreversible character of punitive decrees which had already 
been implemented. But this is not to say that the graphe paranomon was not a 
possibility even after the implementation of a decree, although, in action, the 
volunteer prosecutor, after the lapse of a year for the liability of the author of a 
decree, could opt for another procedure so that the author of the decree would 
be punished. The possibility of attacking a decree with a graphe paranomon at a 
later stage, after it had taken effect, is also supported by [Dem.] 59.90-1, in the 
context of decrees prescribing awards of citizenship, which were meant to last 
for a lifetime. Apollodoros states that naturalisation could be revoked even 
after the award of the grant through the graphe paranomon and he provides 
two examples of naturalised citizens who lost citizenship after a certain time 
from the implementation of the relevant citizenship awards.77 
Nor is it the case that all the implemented decrees would have an irreversible 
73  Cf. Giannadaki 2014: 28-33.
74  Perlman 1963: 342-346, 350. Cf. Finley 1962: 18ff. 
75  The text suggests that the author of the decree was not Autocles (who was tried 
by an eisangelia: Hansen 1975: cat. no. 90); cf. p.4 above.
76  For the flexibility of using various procedures to prosecute a certain offence, see 
Carey 2004: 111-136; Giannadaki 2014: 115-117.
77  Cf. Hansen 1974: cat. nos. 15-16; cf. Kapparis 1999: 370. 
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character. The preserved punitive decrees in literary sources are minimal 
in number (only two ordering instant execution out of the two hundred and 
nineteen decrees: Hansen 1987a: 111-112). Finally, it is reasonable to assume that, 
if the proposer was still liable (whether the decree had been actually enacted or 
not), then he would have to appear in court to support his proposal.78 
In cases of indicted psephismata, the procedure seems to have been 
straightforward: if the court overturned a decree, the author was punished 
and the decree never took effect.79 In the opposite case, when a psephisma 
was upheld by the court, a crucial question arises as to what happened with 
the decree: it is possible that the acquittal effectively passed the decree. The 
evidence is scanty, but we have an inscription recording a decree which was 
attacked through a graphe paranomon, and was upheld at court and apparently 
implemented as a result of the decision of the court.80 So reasonably, the effect 
of the court’s decision was the implementation of the psephisma.
But what happened when a proposal had not been passed by the Ekklesia, 
i.e. it was attacked as a probouleuma, or a proposal made on the spot during an 
Ekklesia meeting? The proposal of Ctesiphon (Dem. 18, Aesch. 3) and the outline 
of Euctemon’s indicted proposal by Androtion, Melanopos and Glaucetes81 
are the only preserved cases of indicted probouleumata to indicate what may 
have happened with the decree after the acquittal of the defendant. Hansen82 
assumes that both speeches (Dem. 18, Aesch. 3) took for granted that conviction 
would mean the end of the matter and the acquittal of Ctesiphon would mean 
implementation of Ctesiphon’s decree.83 Aeschines taken literary would seem 
to suggest that the court has the power not only to acquit Ctesiphon, but also 
to crown Demosthenes (Aesch. 3.232), which implies that acquittal would 
mean ratification of the proposal arising from the court’s decision. Hansen 
may be right to assume that the trial would put an end to the matter, since 
there is never any suggestion that after the trial the decree would then have 
to be brought to the Ekklesia to be voted on.84 Hansen’s assumption may be 
78  Dem. 20.144 with Kremmydas 2012: 47; Rhodes 2009: 224. This is the inference by 
analogy with the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai in which an enacted law would still be 
indicted, and could be supported by the author even if he was free from personal liability. 
Also, the implication from [Dem.] 59.90-91, referring to cases of decrees which have taken 
effect and been challenged with a graphe paranomon at a later stage, is that the proposer 
would still have to support his proposal in court at a later stage even he was not liable for 
punishment. 
79  Hansen 1987: 63; 1974: cat. nos. 4, 5, 17, 18.
80  Stroud 1971: 280-282. Hansen 1974: cat. no. 5. 
81  Dem. 24.9, 11-14. 
82  1987: 66.
83  Cf. Dem. 26.8; Hansen 1987: 63-73 for the trial as the final stage of the dispute 
(although the particulars of his reconstruction are problematic); see pp.9-10 above for the 
legal reconstruction of the case). Hansen 1974: 51-52.
84  Cf. Hansen 1987: 63-73 where he argues in favour of the finality of the court deci-
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further supported by the function and purpose of the graphe paranomon to 
scrutinise legislation (at least primarily):85 it is reasonable to assume that the 
court’s verdict would have some effect on the proposal, as it did in the case of 
conviction, i.e. the removal of the decree and the punishment of the author. 
However, the argument from silence in the speeches is not conclusive for the 
court’s verdict being the final decision on an indicted decree.
Reference to the Ekklesia after the decision of the court is entirely conceivable 
in cases where the proposal had not been enacted, i.e. ratified by the demos. The 
decision of the court would have declared the legality of the proposal, but not 
its desirability in terms of the substance.86 So, one cannot exclude the possibility 
that the enactment of the decree was finally decided by the Ekklesia. But the 
lack of any reference in the preserved speeches to the need to refer  the case 
back to the demos may suggest that there was some law prescribing enactment 
after acquittal in cases of proposals in the Ekklesia which were attacked through 
a graphe paranomon before being ratified. Although it is impossible to answer 
this question with certainty, it is likely that there was a legal prescription that 
stipulated the ‘automatic’ enactment of the proposal. This would explain the 
silence in the sources87 about the reference of the case to the Ekklesia, which 
would normally decide on the desirability of the proposal. 
In cases of probouleumata there is another aspect to be addressed as to 
the procedure followed with regard to the enactment, specifically in cases of 
expired probouleumata, such as Dem. 18 and 23. Aristocrates’ case proves that 
the proposer’s liability is unrelated to the expiry of a probouleuma (Dem. 23.92-
93), and this suggests that in case of conviction Aristocrates would be punished 
and the decree would lapse. But what happened if a probouleuma was upheld 
by the court? Dem. 23.92-93 suggests that a probouleuma which had not been 
enacted within a year became invalid; it was not merely suspended or ‘frozen’, 
as the speaker never challenges this in his anticipation of the argument of 
Aristocrates. This would imply that at the very least, the decision of the court 
declared the legality of the proposal.  Though it is impossible to determine 
with certainty how expired probouleumata, which were then declared legal by 
the court, were ratified, the most obvious and economical explanation would 
be that the court ruling would automatically reinstate the probouleuma. A 
subsequent reference to the Ekklesia is on balance unlikely, given that the jury 
sion, but the evidence from the speeches is inconclusive. Cf. Hannick 1981: 393-397.
85  For graphe paranomon as political and legal review see Yunis 1988: 361-382.
86  This possibility would suggest that the court had declared the legality of the pro-
posal, but the desirability of the decree, its substance, would have to be voted by the Ekk-
lesia, so that the proposal was ratified. Cf. paragraphe: if you prosecute me, and I respond 
with a paragraphe, but my paragraphe is unsuccessful, in theory, the substance of your char-
ge against me has not yet been decided. Rejection of a paragraphe was not, in law, convi-
ction in the original case (irrespective of the prejudice that the outcome of the paragraphe 
case may have had on the original case, in practice). See Todd 1993: 138.
87  This hypothesis would also explain the silence with regard to the enactment of 
Euctemon’s probouleuma after his acquittal (Dem. 24.9, 11-14).
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panels were perceived as the demos sitting as judges.88 
The practical implications are however different for ‘open’ and ‘closed’ 
probouleumata. A ‘closed’ probouleuma ratified by a court could on the 
hypothesis above proceed to implementation.89 But the situation with time-
expired ‘open’ probouleumata suspended by graphe paranomon is different. In 
this case, though acquittal would determine the legality of the proposal, it is 
reasonable to suppose that a successful outcome at the trial would not make 
the probouleuma ‘automatically’ valid, as its content would normally still have 
to be decided by the people. In cases of open probouleumata whose proposer 
had been acquitted, it is possible that if the decision was not made within a 
year, the probouleuma would be deemed to have expired and therefore, it would 
have to be reintroduced. Certainly, some decrees would require immediate 
action, such as the decision about sending out a military expedition, so the 
circumstances to which the open probouleuma responded might have changed 
and the decision about sending out an expedition was no longer appropriate. 
Whatever the reality, the prothesmia law (or possible subsequent revisions of 
the law/ clause(s)) is equally likely to have stated what would happen after an 
acquittal by the court in cases of probouleumata. 
Conclusion
As this article argues, there was a statutory limitation of one year to 
the liability of the author in graphe paranomon cases, and this time limit 
commenced from the time of the passage of the decree by the Boule or its formal 
introduction to, or passage by, the Ekklesia. The sources are scanty and the 
rationale of the Athenian laws is never articulated,90 but it is firmly embedded 
within the system, and we can with some plausibility tease out the rationale of 
the existence of this statutory limitation from this scanty evidence.91  One year 
88  Cf. Ath. Pol. 41.2 ἁπάντων γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν πεποίηκεν ὁ δῆμος κύριον, καὶ πάντα 
διοικεῖται ψηφίσμασιν καὶ δικαστηρίοις, ἐν οἷς ὁ δῆμός ἐστιν ὁ κρατῶν. Rhodes 1981: 489. 
Cf. Hansen 2010: 499–536 who allows both the Ekklesia and the courts to be seen as embo-
dying the polis.
89  Another possibility would be that after the acquittal of the author at the original 
trial, the expired probouleuma would then have to be passed again in the same or similar 
form and content in the Boule and the Ekklesia. This is certainly conceivable, and MacDow-
ell (2009: 197 n.120) has entertained that possibility, but this would make the legislative 
procedure significantly more time-consuming and the verdict of the court would have no 
effect, in essence, on the proposal, if the proposal would have to go through the Boule and 
the Ekklesia.  
90  Compare the parallel discussion of the evolution of the function of Attic tragedy 
as against its purpose as discussed by Goldhill 2000: 34-56 (esp. 37-40), which illustrates 
our difficulty in tracing the underlying purpose of any particular social phenomenon; in 
our case, we need to bear in mind that the Athenian understanding of the procedure, as 
distinct from the original reason for its creation, could have changed in use by a tacit con-
sensus. Cf. Giannadaki 2016. 
91  One should bear in mind that there might not have been a single ‘Athenian ratio-
nale’ in legislating, and in particular in the case of the statutory limitation of liability in 
32 Ifigeneia Giannadaki
was presumably considered an adequate period to spot the illegality and lodge 
the charge against the decree to ensure that the author would be punished (if 
convicted) and the illegal decree would not be enacted.92 After the interval of 
one year, the Athenians could still punish the author of a decree by employing 
other public prosecutions, as the case of Callixenos indicates. 
Ifigeneia Giannadaki
Royal Holloway University of London, University College London
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